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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State charged Mr. Beeks with felony violation of a no contact order based
upon the allegation that Mr. Beeks had been convicted twice for prior violations of no
contact orders in the past five years. Mr. Beeks was convicted of felony violation of a
no contact order following a jury trial.
Mr. Beeks timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence.
appeal, he asserts that the district court erred in instructing the jury.

On

Specifically, he

contends that the district court should have instructed the jury as to the union of act and
intent requirement, and that acts or omissions committed through misfortune or
accident, and with no evil design, intention or culpable negligence, are not criminal.

Mr. Beeks also contends that the State engaged in several instances of misconduct
during his trial, which occurred during voir dire and closing statements. The prosecutor
told the jury several times that there was additional information that he was not allowed
to tell them, and later told the jury he was not allowed to introduce evidence of
Mr. Beeks'

prior domestic

assault

or

domestic

battery

charge.

Although

the

prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to, Mr. Beeks asserts that it amounted to
fundamental error and, therefore, can be considered on appeal.

The misconduct

violated Mr. Beeks' right to a fair trial and due process.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's contention that the district
court did not err in instructing the jury.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedin s
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Beeks' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err by failing to instruct the jury on the necessary intent
element of the crime, and by refusing to instruct the jury that acts or omissions
committed through misfortune or accident, and with no evil design, intention or
culpable negligence, are not criminal?

2.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of fundamental
error when it elicited testimony regarding the existence of two no contact orders,
and when it repeatedly told the jury that there was additional information that the
prosecutor was not allowed to tell the jury, including that Mr. Beeks had
previously been charged with either domestic assault or domestic battery?1

1

Analysis of the prosecutorial misconduct issue was fully addressed in Mr. Beeks'
Appellant's Brief and will not be further discussed herein.
3

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred By Failing To Instruct The Ju I As To The Intent Element Of
The Offense, And By Refusing To Instruct The Jury That Acts Or Omissions Committed
Through Misfortune Or Accident Are Not Criminal
In Idaho, all crimes require a union of act and intent. In this case the jury was
never instructed as to this requirement. Such was error.
The State claims that there was "no reasonable view of the evidence that would
require a 'union of act and intent' instruction." (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) The State
also represents that State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924 (1993), stands for the proposition that
"where the criminal statute does not set forth any mental state as an element of the
statute, 'the intention with which the act is done, or the lack of criminal intent in the
premises,

is

immaterial."'

(Respondent's

Brief,

p.9.)

However,

the

State's

representation of the holding in Fox is inaccurate. The Idaho Supreme Court actually
held in Fox that because the statutory definition of possession of a controlled substance
does not expressly require any mental element, and I.C. § 18-114 only requires a joint
union of act and general intent, possession of a controlled substance is a general intent
crime, i.e., the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance meets the intent
element. Fox, 124 Idaho at 926.
In Idaho, conviction for a criminal offense requires the jury to find a requisite state
of mind. State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509 (Ct. App. 2005). In Macias, the Idaho Court of
Appeals held that a misfortune or accident defense jury instruction was proper, but not
required, in a battery prosecution because the jury had already been instructed on the
requisite state of mind element by way of the jury instructions on: (1) the elements of
battery, (2) willful acts, and (3) the requirement of union or joint operation of act and
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intent. Id. at 511. The Court in Macias held that the subject matter of the requested
instruction was sufficiently covered by the instructions actually given to the jury. Id.
In this case, the jury was never instructed as to the requisite state of mind
element. Idaho Code Section 18-114 requires that for every crime, "there must exist a
union or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence." The intent required
by I. C. § 18-920 is not the intent to commit a crime but is merely the intent to perform
the interdicted act, or by criminal negligence, the failure to perform the required act. Id.
Therefore, a violation of I.C. § 18-920 requires general intent; namely, that a person
with a domestic assault or domestic battery charge or conviction, after having been
notified of the existence of a no contact order, intentionally had contact with the person
he was prohibited from contacting, not that he or she intended to commit a crime.
Here, the only instruction specific to the offense was the general elements
instruction. (R., p.350.) Notably, unlike in Macias, in Mr. Beeks' case, the requirement
of union or joint operation of act and intent instruction was not given, and the elements
instruction did not specify what intent was necessary to find Mr. Beeks guilty.
(R., p.350.) Thus the jury in this case was never instructed as to the mens rea of the
offense. This was error, particularly where the primary contested issue during the trial
was whether Mr. Beeks violated the no contact order by accident, where Ms. Murillo
took multiple steps to facilitate the contact and mislead Mr. Beeks about the status of
the no contact order. Thus, the jury was not properly instructed.
At trial, one of the facts in dispute was whether Mr. Beeks attended the video visit
believing either that he was not going to be speaking to Ms. Murillo, as his visitor was
identified as "John Lawrence," or that the no contact order had been dropped. (Trial
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Tr., p.16, L.23 - p.17, L.10; State's Trial Exhibit 1.) Where the facts of Mr. Beeks' case
seriously call into question whether Mr. Beeks had any intent to participate in a jail visit
with Ms. Murillo, it was error for the

district court not to instruct the jury on the

requirement that there be a union of act and intent.
The district court further erred in refusing to instruct the jury on culpability for acts
or omissions committed through misfortune or accident, where the evidence adduced at
trial supported giving such an instruction and Mr. Beeks requested such an instruction.
The State disputes Mr. Beeks' claim of error as to the district court's refusal to
give his requested instruction on "misfortune or accident." (Respondent's Brief, pp:1113.) The State claims t11at it is not a reasonable vievlf of the evidence that Mr. Beeks
accidentally spoke with Ms. Murillo.

(Respondent's Brief, p.12.) However, this is

inaccurate.
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009). A
trial court must instruct the jury on "all matters of law necessary for their information."
I.C. § 19-2132(a). A requested jury instruction must be given if: (1) it properly states
the governing law; (2) a reasonable view of at least some evidence would support the
defendant's legal theory; (3) the subject of the requested instruction is not adequately
addressed by other jury instructions; and (4) the requested instruction does not
constitute an impermissible comment on the evidence. Macias, 142 Idaho at 510.
First, the State concedes that the requested instruction properly stated the
governing law, and since the requested instruction was a pattern jury instruction, Idaho
Criminal Jury Instruction 1508, it is presumptively correct. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho
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5(37, 571 n.2 (2010). Second, a reasonable view of the evidence supported Mr. Beeks'

theory of the case. Evidence was adduced at trial which demonstrated that Mr. Beeks
took steps to avoid contact with Ms. Murillo. Specifically, the video presented at trial
clearly contains a series of questions from Mr. Beeks to Ms. Murillo regarding whether it
was "okay to talk", i.e., whether the no contact order was still in place. (State's Trial
Exhibit 1.) Further, it appeared that Mr. Beeks was being cautious and trying to obey
the terms of the no contact order and that he appeared ready to leave the room in order
to obey the law. (State's Trial Exhibit 1.) Ultimately, he only remained in the video visit
room in reliance on Ms. Murillo's representation that it was okay to talk. (State's Trial
Exhibit 1.) The evidence presented by the defense was enough for the district court to
find that defense counsel could argue (without the requested instruction) that Mr. Beeks'
contact with Ms. Murillo was inadvertent or an accident. (Supp. Trial Tr., p.79, L.19 p.80, L. 7, p.80, L.24 - p.82, L.5.) This indicates an understanding by the district court
that the facts of the case supported such an argument.

Thus, the district court's

unwillingness to instruct the jury as to a misfortunate event or accident was error where
Mr. Beeks requested the instruction, and the district court implicitly acknowledged that
defense counsel could make a feasible argument that the contact was accidental. The
evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that Mr. Beeks' contact with Ms. Murillo was
either purely accidental or based on a mistaken belief that she had the no contact order
lifted.

Thus, the giving of such an instruction would not have constituted an

impermissible comment on the evidence. Additionally, the subject of the requested jury
instruction was not adequately addressed by the other jury instructions.
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The facts of this case are somewhat similar to the facts in a recent Idaho Court of
Appeals decision, State v. Hopkins,

Idaho __ , 345 P.3d 250 (20·15), in which the

Court held that the trial court erred in denying the defense's requested jury instruction
on defense of accident and such error was not harmless.

In Hopkins, the defendant

had slammed a courtroom door hard enough to damage the wall behind it and was
subsequently charged with malicious injury to property. Id. at 252-53. The defendant
testified that she did not intend to damage the wall, and she did not know she had done
so until an officer called her at home. Id. at 253. Although the defense requested that
the jury be instructed as to the defense of accident, the trial court denied the request,
and the jury convicted the defendant. Id. at 253-54. The Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction, finding that a malicious injury to property conviction required the State to
prove that the defendant intentionally injured the property. Hopkins, 245 P.3d at 256.
The instructions given in the case precluded the defense the defendant wished to
advance-that her act in damaging the property was an accident, or unintentional. Id.
Because the other jury instructions did not adequately cover the issue of the requisite
mental element, and the requested instruction would have informed the jury of this
defense, the trial court erred in refusing to give the accident instruction. Id. at 257. The
Court of Appeals found the error was not harmless where the defense presented
evidence that the defendant did not intend to damage the wall, and noted that the
evidence presented was sufficient for the trial court to indicate its belief that the
defendant did not intend to damage the wall. Id.
As discussed above, the intent necessary for a conviction of violation of a no
contact order was not explained by the jury instructions, and an instruction on the
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requirement of union or joint operation of act and intent was absent.

As such, the

absence of the union of act and intent instruction, in addition to the district court's
refusal to give the requested accident instruction, left the jury without any guidance as
to the mens rea of the crime. Where the other jury instructions did not adequately cover
the issue of the requisite mental element, and the requested instruction would have
informed the jury of this defense, the trial court erred in refusing to give the accident
instruction. See Hopkins, 345 P.3d at 257.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Beeks respectfully requests that this Court vacate
his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.
DATED this 30 th day of April, 2015.
.

/

j

c/(

j
\
SALLY J. COOLE~
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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